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Abstract
In the recent philosophical literature, several counterexamples to the inter-
pretative principle that symmetry-related models are physically equivalent
have been suggested (Belot 2013, Belot 2018, Fletcher 2020). Arguments
based on these counterexamples can be understood as arguments from sci-
entific practice of roughly the following form: because in scientific practice
such-and-such symmetry-related models are treated as representing dis-
tinct physical situations, these models indeed represent distinct physical
situations. In this paper, a strategy for analysing arguments of this type is
presented and applied to the examples that can be found in the literature.
I argue that if we are exclusively interested in models understood as rep-
resenting entire possible worlds (not their subsystems), arguments from
scientific practice should involve some additional assumptions to guaran-
tee that they are relevant for models understood in this way. However,
none of the examples presented in the literature satisfy all these addi-
tional assumptions, which leads to the conclusion that arguments from
scientific practice based on these examples do not undermine the inter-




A symmetry of a physical theory is a transformation of some kind that
induces a bijection on the set of models of that theory (models of the the-
ory always get transformed into models and non-models into non-models).
There are different types of symmetries, the most familiar of which are
spatio-temporal symmetries consisting of a transformation of the spatio-
temporal variables in terms of which the equations of a theory are written.
However, this is not the only type of symmetry (see, e.g., Belot 2013:3-6
for a classification). Consequently, various questions about symmetries
always need to be disambiguated by specifying what kind of symmetries
we are talking about.
In all standard cases of physical theories, symmetry transformations
form a group that acts on the space of models. As a result, symmetries
induce an equivalence relation between models because of the correspon-
dence between mathematical features of groups and equivalence relations:
the existence of an identity element leads to reflexivity, the existence of
inverse elements leads to the relation being symmetric and the group com-
position leads to its being transitive.
This is a purely mathematical fact, but one can further ask what the
significance of these equivalence classes is (cf. Castellani 2003). One idea
in the literature is that the presence of symmetries indicates that a theory
contains a “surplus structure”, and, therefore, for each equivalence class
all its elements are physically equivalent. This idea can be made precise
in several ways (see section 2). The crucial observation is that models of
a given theory can be understood either as representing entire possible
worlds (which I will call the “world-interpretation”) or only subsystems
of possible worlds (which I will call the “subsystem-interpretation”). I
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will focus on two formulations of the idea that symmetry-related models
are physically equivalent that will be called SYM-ONE-Q-W and SYM-
ONE-H-W. Both concern models understood as representing entire pos-
sible worlds (which is indicated by “W”). The first of them takes into
account only qualitative identity (“Q”), whereas the second one also con-
cerns haecceistic identity (“H”).
In the recent philosophical literature, several counterexamples against
the idea that symmetry-related models are physically equivalent have been
presented (Belot 2013, Belot 2018, Fletcher 2020). Arguments based on
these examples can be regarded as instances of arguments from scientific
practice and have roughly the following form: because in scientific practice
such-and-such symmetry-related models are treated as representing dis-
tinct physical situations, these models indeed represent distinct physical
situations. The aim of this paper is to provide a strategy for analysing ar-
guments of this form (understood as arguments against SYM-ONE-Q-W
or SYM-ONE-H-W) and to apply it to the cases put forward by Belot and
Fletcher. The general idea of my argumentation is that although these
examples show that certain models under the subsystem-interpretation
represent distinct physical situations, this is not sufficient to show that
the same models under the world-interpretation represent distinct possible
worlds.
The following is the plan for this paper. In section 2, I will consider dif-
ferent formulations of the interpretative principle that symmetry-related
models are physically equivalent. Two of them, SYM-ONE-Q-W and
SYM-ONE-H-W, will be chosen for further investigation. Section 3 will
provide a rough version of the form of arguments from scientific practice
against these interpretative principles. In section 4, potential counterex-
amples to these principles presented in the literature will be reviewed.
Section 5 will provide some refinements to the form of arguments from sci-
entific practice established in section 3, which are indispensable for them
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to work against SYM-ONE-Q-W or SYM-ONE-H-W. These refinements
will lead to a list of conditions that counterexamples need to satisfy for
the argument to go through, which will be presented at the beginning of
section 6. The rest of this section will be devoted to checking whether the
counterexamples reviewed in section 4 satisfy all these conditions, with
the conclusion being that none of them does. Section 7 will provide a
short summary of the results.
2 Formulation of the problem
The idea that symmetry-related models are physically equivalent can be
made precise in different ways. These more precise formulations may be
called “interpretative principles”. Under the first and rather liberal view,
it is assumed that each model can represent various physical situations,
but for two symmetry-related models the sets of these situations are the
same:
SYM-MANY: Two models of a physical theory are symmetry-
related iff they can represent the same possible physical situa-
tions.
Assuming that any model can represent only one possible physical situa-
tion, SYM-MANY leads to a more restrictive interpretative principle:
SYM-ONE: Two models of a physical theory are symmetry-
related iff they can represent the same possible physical situa-
tion.
In what follows, I will focus on the latter, more restrictive principle
(i.e., SYM-ONE). All counterexamples that will be reviewed in section
4 are supposed to undermine SYM-ONE. Some of them could also be
used to argue against SYM-MANY. However, if we succeed in showing
that they fail to undermine SYM-ONE, there will be no reason to also
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consider SYM-MANY, which is the weakening of SYM-ONE.
The proper understanding of these interpretative principles requires
certain precisifications. First, in both principles there is an implicit uni-
versal quantification over physical theories and, for a given physical theory,
over all its models (as will also be the case for all their later refinements).1
Second, we should say something about the word “can” used in the
formulation of these principles. Its usage follows Fletcher (2020). This
terminology is equivalent to the terminology of representational capacities
of models (Weatherall 2018:332, Fletcher 2020:230) and of models being
well-suited to represent something (Belot 2013). Why do we talk about
what models can represent instead of talking about what models do in
fact represent? What does it mean that a model can represent something
but does not actually represent it? These are important questions, but it
seems to me that giving an answer to them here would settle too much in
advance about our topic, so I will leave the word “can” unanalysed here,
as do the authors I am referring to. However, I will give three examples,
which at least will show that in certain contexts the distinction cannot be
collapsed.
Example (i): imagine that we are using models of n-particle classical
mechanics to represent a subsystem of the universe, taking our laboratory
as a reference frame. With a reference frame fixed, there is a unique an-
swer to the question about the positions and momenta of our n particles,
so exactly one model actually represents them in this context. However,
other models also can represent this physical situation, and if we changed
1To avoid any confusion, below I present the formulation of our principles that is more
explicit formally:
SYM-MANY: For any physical theory T and for any two models of T , M1
and M2: M1 and M2 are symmetry-related iff there is a class of possible physical
situations P such that both M1 and M2 can represent all and only possible physical
situations belonging to P .
SYM-ONE: For any physical theory T and for any two models of T , M1 and
M2: M1 and M2 are symmetry-related iff there is a possible physical situation
such that both M1 and M2 can represent it and they cannot represent any other
possible physical situation.
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the reference frame, this “can represent” would become “actually repre-
sent” for one of these models.2
Example (ii): it might happen that the same model represents different
physical situations with different degrees of adequacy (i.e., it represents
some physical situation with a certain degree of adequacy and some other
with a smaller or larger degree). This sense of “can” will not be of my
interest here, so whenever I say that two models can represent certain
possible physical situations (or possible worlds), this means that they can
represent them with the same degree of adequacy. In other words, in
all principles considered here, the degree of adequacy of representation is
treated as fixed.
Example (iii): it might happen that the same possible world contains
two qualitatively identical subsystems. Then one can use the same model
to represent each of them. If we do not require the representations to
be fully adequate, the subsystems do not need to be exactly qualitatively
identical, it suffices if they are appropriately similar. For example, the
Schwarzschild model of GR can be used to represent different black holes.
However, if in a given context it represents one of them, it does not rep-
resent any of the others in that context (cf. Roberts 2020:5).
As the focus of this paper is the defence of the most restrictive version
of SYM-ONE and the distinction between “can represent” and “actually
represent” is interesting only in the case in which a model can represent
more than one physical situation (or possible world), the lack of spec-
ification of the exact meaning of “can” will not be threatening for our
conclusions.3
2Transformations here are understood passively, so this is not in conflict with what is
claimed on p. 8.
3Does this mean that if a model can represent exactly one physical situation/possible world,
then it always actually represents it? Not necessarily so, as we might choose to not represent
anything physical by this model and consider only its mathematical features, or change our
standard representative conventions (to take an extreme example, one can use all models of
classical mechanics to represent the Eiffel Tower). In all our considerations we assume that the
standard representative conventions are used (i.e., ~x in classical mechanics represent positions,
~E in electrodynamics represents the electric field, an so on).
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Third, there is an implicit assumption that the general type of the
system is fixed. The need for this assumption arises because different
physical phenomena can sometimes be described by the same equations.
For example, the harmonic oscillator equation accurately describes both
a mass on a spring and an electric circuit (this is Fletcher’s 2020:234-235
example). However, this is not the type of difference we are interested in.
Fourth, it is often the case that a model does not represent all features
of a physical situation. Therefore, “representing a physical situation”
should be understood modulo features of this situation that are not ex-
pressible in a given theory.
Fifth, the term “physical situation” is ambiguous, as a (possible) phys-
ical situation can be thought of as either encompassing the entire (possi-
ble) world or as encompassing only a subsystem of a (possible) world. At
first glance, it is not obvious whether this distinction is important for our
considerations, as one can make the following conjecture:4
S-W-Equivalence: Whatever interpretative principles are true
for models under the world-interpretation, they are also true
for these models under the subsystem-interpretation, and the
other way around.
I think that this conjecture is false; at least for spatio-temporal symme-
tries there are good reasons for thinking that the way in which the models
under the world-interpretation represent is in certain important respects
different than the way in which (mathematically identical!) models under
the subsystem-interpretation represent. This is because in the subsystem
case, certain physical objects not represented explicitly in the model can
nevertheless be represented implicitly,5 and spatio-temporal symmetries
can be thought of as changing the relations of the explicitly represented
subsystem of the universe to these implicitly represented objects. Let
4Cf. Fletcher (2020:236), who claims that breaking this equivalence would be ad hoc.
5This idea is mentioned by Caulton (2015:158, footnote 17) and discussed in more depth
by Pooley (2017:136–140) and Luc (2021).
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us take as an example classical mechanics and translations, which are
dynamical symmetries of this theory. Consider a model of classical me-
chanics consisting of n objects (either point-like or extended). What is
the meaning of the positions and momenta of these n objects written in
a particular reference frame? If we are interested only in the relations
between these n objects (i.e., in the internal features of the n-body sys-
tem), then only frame-independent information is relevant. However, if
we think of our reference frame as being associated with an observer O6,
then positions and momenta in this particular reference frame are posi-
tions and momenta relative to O. As O is assumed to be a real physical
object, these positions and momenta are physically meaningful quantities.
What changes when we perform a translation? It depends on whether it
is understood actively or passively. Under the passive understanding of
the translation, it amounts to changing a reference frame to another one,
which may be associated with another observer O′. If there is indeed
such an O′, then positions and momenta in this new reference frame are
positions and momenta relative to O′. Under the active understanding of
the translation, it amounts to changing positions and momenta of n bod-
ies composing our system relative to O (so the observer does not change
here). This translation-related model represents a different physical sit-
uation than the original one, as some physical quantities are different
than in the original situation (namely, the relations of our n explicitly
represented objects to implicitly represented O). Therefore, under the
subsystem-interpretation of the models of classical mechanics and under
the active interpretation of translations, translation-related models can be
thought of as representing different physical situations—even though not
intrinsically different, as they differ only in their relations to the implicitly
represented observer associated with the reference frame. This interpre-
tation is valid only in some contexts (in particular, there must indeed be
6By an “observer” I mean just any reference object, not necessarily human, which is a
common way of speaking in physics.
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some physical object located at the origin of the reference frame), but the
existence of such contexts should be uncontroversial.
What would change if our two translation-related models were in-
terpreted as representing entire possible worlds instead of representing
subsystems? In that case, all the physical objects existing in each of
these worlds would be represented explicitly in the respective models,
so there would be no further objects that could be represented implic-
itly. Therefore, translations (understood actively) would no longer admit
an interpretation of the changes of relations of the system represented
explicitly in the model to some external physical object represented im-
plicitly. One can still maintain that translation-related models under the
world-interpretation represent distinct possible worlds, but this view in
the case of the world-interpretation is much less attractive than in the
case of the subsystem-interpretation (and in fact it is rarely encountered
in the contemporary literature; cf. Pooley 2013, Belot 2018:948). If this
analysis is correct, then translation-related models under the subsystem-
interpretation can represent different possible physical situations, whereas
under the world-interpretation they cannot represent different possible
physical situations, which is a failure of S-W-Equivalence.7
Therefore, we need to decide whether we want to consider our interpre-
tative principles concerning symmetries in the version for entire worlds,
in the version for subsystems or in both versions. In our example of trans-
7S-W-Equivalence would be more plausible if we were restricted to the internal features of
the represented subsystems and abstracted away from their relations to any external, implic-
itly represented physical objects. This way of thinking can be further supported by observing
that the whole idea of implicit representation may sound rather suspicious—one could claim
that either something is represented explicitly in the model or is not represented at all. How-
ever, the concept of implicit representation seems to be needed to account for how models
under the subsystem-interpretation are actually used. When scientists test the predictions of
a physical theory, they make observations and measurements in a particular reference frame
(often called “laboratory reference frame”), which is associated with a real physical object
(namely, the concrete laboratory, where these scientists are working) and is often not repre-
sented explicitly in the model. This way of thinking is also visible in textbook presentations of
classical mechanics and special relativity, where reference frames are usually associated with
“observers” (see, e.g., Gregory 2006:40, 259; Morin 2008:509-512; Rindler 1982:7). Therefore,
I assume that the idea of an implicitly represented reference object and its (also implicitly
represented) relations to the explicitly represented system is tenable.
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lations in classical mechanics, SYM-ONE fails (at least in some contexts)
for models thought of as representing subsystems, but (arguably) SYM-
ONE is still true for (mathematically the same!) models thought of as
representing entire worlds, because our way of justifying that symmetry-
related models under the subsystem-interpretation do not represent the
same physical situation is not available under the world-interpretation
(there are no objects outside of the universe to which the universe might
be related). This suggests that SYM-ONE can be true only for models
under the world-interpretation, if at all. For models under the subsystem-
interpretation it is false, and no sophisticated examples are needed to show
this; the simplest ones (such as translations in classical mechanics) suf-
fice. However, most of the disputants seem to have in mind models under
the world-interpretation, as the debate is often framed in terms of possi-
ble worlds. Therefore, in this paper only the versions of SYM-ONE and
SYM-MANY for entire possible worlds will be considered.
The sixth ambiguity in our interpretative principles (i.e., SYM-MANY
and SYM-ONE) concerns how the “sameness” of physical situations should
be understood: do only qualitative differences matter or also haecceistic
ones? To complicate this even more, (merely) haecceistic differences can
be of two types. The first type is when two qualitatively identical sit-
uations contain the same individuals but differ in which properties each
individual possesses. The second type is when two situations are qualita-
tively the same and contain different individuals (of course, “different” in
a non-qualitative sense)—that is, there is at least one individual involved
in one of these situations but not in the other. The first sense of haec-
ceistic difference is more common in the philosophical discussions about
space-time. For example, Pooley (2013) defines haecceistic difference in
the following way: the difference between two possible worlds is merely
haecceistic if “they differ only over which space-time points instantiate
which of the particular features common to both worlds”. The second
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sense of haecceistic difference is difficult to find in the debates about
space-time (I think this is because the issue of possible worlds differing
merely haecceistically emerges in the philosophy of physics in the con-
text of symmetry transformations, which seem to generate such worlds,
but they do not change the range of what there is), although it is a vi-
tal option for more general metaphysical debates. For example, the view
that it is not necessary what there is (called “contingentism”, see, e.g.,
Williamson 2013:2) allows that there are possible worlds differing haec-
ceistically in the second sense (on its own, contingentism does not entail
this thesis—to get an entailment here, one would need to add some other
metaphysical assumptions). However, if we are interested in the subsys-
tems rather than entire worlds, the second type of haecceistic difference
is something not only conceivable but (arguably) sometimes actually en-
countered: two numerically distinct subsystems of the same world can
be represented by the same model provided that they are qualitatively
identical (cf. example (iii) on p. 6).8 As both qualitative and haecceistic
differences are worth studying, in what follows I will consider two versions
of SYM-ONE:
SYM-ONE-Q-W: Two models of a physical theory under the
world-interpretation are symmetry-related iff they can repre-
sent the same possible worlds and these possible worlds do not
differ qualitatively (at most, they differ haecceistically9).
SYM-ONE-H-W: Two models of a physical theory under the
world-interpretation are symmetry-related iff there is exactly
one possible world they can represent.
As previously, these principles involve an implicit universal quantifi-
cation over theories and over models.10 According to SYM-ONE-Q-W,
8Perfect qualitative identity is rather rare, but sufficient qualitative similarity in the rele-
vant respects is quite common—without it, scientific experiments would not be repeatable.
9Both types of haecceistic differences mentioned in the main text are taken into account
here.
10Therefore, the more explicit formulation of these principles is as follows:
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two symmetry-related models under the world-interpretation represent
the same possible world understood qualitatively, but still the worlds
represented by these two models can differ haecceistically. In contrast,
according to SYM-ONE-H-W, two symmetry-related models under the
world-interpretation represent the same possible world in both a qualita-
tive and a haecceistic sense (that is, in all possible senses of sameness).11
SYM-ONE-Q-W follows from SYM-ONE-H-W12 but not the other way
around. This means that one can reject SYM-ONE-H-W without reject-
ing SYM-ONE-Q-W, but rejecting SYM-ONE-Q-W amounts to rejecting
SYM-ONE-H-W as well. Some of the counterexamples that will be con-
sidered in section 4 are supposed to undermine only SYM-ONE-H-W, but
others are supposed to also undermine SYM-ONE-Q-W. As my aim will be
to show that both kinds of counterexamples are unsuccessful, I will focus
mainly on the stronger principle, SYM-ONE-H-W; if any of the coun-
SYM-ONE-Q-W: For any physical theory T and for any two models of T , M1
and M2: if M1 and M2 are considered under the world-interpretation, then M1
and M2 are symmetry-related iff there is a class of possible worlds P such that
the elements of P do not differ qualitatively, and both M1 and M2 can represent
all and only possible worlds belonging to P .
SYM-ONE-H-W: For any physical theory T and for any two models of T , M1
and M2: if M1 and M2 are considered under the world-interpretation, then M1
and M2 are symmetry-related iff there is a possible world such that both M1 and
M2 can represent it and they cannot represent any other possible world.
11SYM-ONE-H-W is not a haecceistic principle in the sense of presupposing the truth of
haecceitism (i.e., the view that there can be merely haecceistic differences). It might be true
even if there is no such thing as merely haecceistic differences at all. “H” in SYM-ONE-
H-W indicates that in contrast to SYM-ONE-Q-W, it excludes that two symmetry-related
models under the world-interpretation can represent possible worlds differing haecceistically.
According to SYM-ONE-H-W, such models can represent possible worlds that differ neither
qualitatively nor haecceistically, which is equivalent to saying that there is exactly one pos-
sible world they can represent (for possible worlds to be different, they need to differ either
qualitatively or haecceistically).
12This is easy to show, but let me do this once. Assume SYM-ONE-H-W, that is, for any
physical theory T and for any two models of T , M1 and M2, under the world-interpretation:
M1 and M2 are symmetry-related iff there is exactly one possible world that M1 and M2 can
represent. Now, take any theory T and any pair of its models, M1 and M2, considered under
the world-interpretation. Assume that M1 and M2 are symmetry-related. By SYM-ONE-H-
W, there is exactly one possible world that M1 and M2 can represent (call it w). Therefore,
the class of possible worlds that can be represented by M1 is the same as the class of possible
worlds that can be represented by M2—namely, this is the singleton that has w as its only
element (and of course the elements of this class differ at most haecceistically—in fact, they
do not differ at all, as there is only one element). As we have considered an arbitrary T and
an arbitrary pair of its models, this establishes SYM-ONE-Q-W.
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terexamples were successful, this principle surely would be undermined.
However, I think that counterexamples directed specifically against SYM-
ONE-Q-W are more interesting in the context of the existing literature
because this interpretative principle is much less commonly discussed.13
Analogously, one can precisify SYM-MANY:
SYM-MANY-Q-W: Two models of a physical theory under
the world-interpretation are symmetry-related iff they can rep-
resent the same possible worlds (neither qualitative identity
nor qualitative distinctness of these worlds is assumed).
SYM-MANY-H-W: Two models of a physical theory under
the world-interpretation are symmetry-related iff they can rep-
resent the same possible worlds and these possible worlds do
not differ qualitatively (at most, they differ haecceistically).
As always, these principles involve an implicit universal quantification
over theories and over models.14 Observe that SYM-MANY-H-W implies
SYM-MANY-Q-W but not the other way around and that SYM-MANY-
H-W is the same as SYM-ONE-Q-W.
Seventh, the above formulations are still ambiguous, as long as we
do not provide the exact meaning of the term “symmetry”. The most
liberal definition could be that any permutation of the set of models of
13For example, in the literature about the Hole Argument, it is usually assumed that there
are no qualitative differences between possible worlds represented by two models related by
the hole diffeomorphism, and the discussion concerns the question whether they represent
two possible worlds differing only haecceistically or just one possible world (and what the
consequences of each option for the ontology of space-time are). See, for example, Pooley
(2013, section 7) and references therein.
14Therefore, the more explicit formulation of these principles is as follows:
SYM-MANY-Q-W: For any physical theory T and for any two models of T ,
M1 and M2: if M1 and M2 are considered under the world-interpretation, then
M1 and M2 are symmetry-related iff there is a class of possible worlds P such
that both M1 and M2 can represent all and only possible worlds belonging to P .
SYM-MANY-H-W: For any physical theory T and for any two models of T ,
M1 and M2: if M1 and M2 are considered under the world-interpretation, then
M1 and M2 are symmetry-related iff there is a class of possible worlds P such that
the elements of P do not differ qualitatively, and both M1 and M2 can represent
all and only possible worlds belonging to P .
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a theory counts as a symmetry (cf. Belot 2013:3). If even the weakest
of our interpretative principles (i.e., SYM-MANY-Q-W) was true for this
understanding of symmetries, it would mean that for any physical theory
all its models can represent the same possible worlds (because for any
two models there exists a bijection on the set of models that exchanges
them). This would make the theory unable to make distinctions between
physical situations it is supposed to make and eventually render it use-
less. Therefore, this definition is clearly too liberal, and we need some
more restrictions on our notion of symmetry. An additional support for
this need comes from the analysis of the examples of symmetries actually
discussed in physics (see, e.g., Sundermeyer 2014), which contain much
less than the set of all bijections on the set of models.
We are left with two questions. First, how should the set of bijections
on the set of models be restricted to get the extension of the word “sym-
metry” that is closer to physicists’ use? Second (and more importantly for
our topic), for what understanding of symmetries are the interpretative
principles such as SYM-ONE-Q-W and/or SYM-ONE-H-W true? I will
not provide general answers to these questions. I will restrict my consid-
eration to dynamical symmetries (i.e., symmetries preserving the theory’s
dynamics), so that whenever two models will be said to be “symmetry-
related”, it will mean “related by a dynamical symmetry”. All interpre-
tative principles will be considered only for dynamical symmetries. This
choice will not be fully argued for here, but it is dynamical symmetries
that are most often considered by physicists and philosophers (in particu-
lar, all examples reviewed in section 4 are of this type), and there are some
general arguments for the thesis that precisely these symmetries should
be regarded as associated with physical equivalence (see, e.g., Baker 2010,
Wallace 2019 and Dewar 2022, section 6.2).
One could try to define symmetries simply by means of our interpre-
tative principles. Such a definition would look as follows: “a symmetry
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of a theory T is any transformation of T that satisfies S”, where S is
SYM-ONE-H-W, SYM-ONE-Q-W, SYM-MANY-H-W or SYM-MANY-
Q-W. This would give us four (in fact three, because of the equivalence
of SYM-ONE-Q-W and SYM-MANY-H-W) senses of the word “symme-
try”. However, I think this is not a good strategy for defining symmetries.
First, it is not commonplace in the literature, so it would be revisionary.
Second, it makes the chosen principle analytically true and in this way
trivially resolves the debate about which of our interpretative principles
(if any!) is true. Of course, one could then ask which transformations of
a given theory are symmetries in the sense of our new definition, so the
debate could reappear in a different wording. However, I think that it
is more natural to start with the notion of symmetries defined in a way
that is independent of our interpretative principles and then ask which of
them (if any) are true for symmetries understood in this way.
3 The form of arguments from scientific
practice
In the recent philosophical literature on symmetries (e.g., Belot 2018,
Weatherall 2018, Fletcher 2020), the idea emerged that interpretative
principles such as SYM-ONE or SYM-MANY (and all their versions)
should be analysed in the context of scientific practice in which the models
these principles are about are actually used. In particular, philosophical
discussions should take into account and respect how scientists use the
relevant concepts. For example, Belot (2018:946) begins his paper, enti-
tled Fifty Million Elvis Fans Can’t be Wrong (which is also the title of
Elvis Presley’s album), by stating:
About some things—such as the fact that Elvis was peachy-
keen—his legions of fans could not be wrong, just because
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there were so many of them. Similarly, might makes right
whenever a large group of people uses a word or a concept in
a certain way—if you are interested in providing an account of
how that word or concept works, then you had better be able
to accommodate their use (not necessarily only their use, of
course). With this in mind, I take another look here at some
classic questions about the counting of possibilities from the
philosophy of space and time, paying special attention to how
physicists count possibilities.
Belot wants to approach the problem of “counting possibilities” (i.e.,
whether a symmetry transformation applied to some model leads to a
model that is only mathematically different or whether in addition it rep-
resents a different possibility than the one represented by the original
model) by focusing on how physicists themselves count possibilities. And
he claims that indeed in some cases they do this differently than some
philosophers. For example, later in the same paper, he argues that be-
cause physicists distinguish between gauge symmetries and physical sym-
metries and regard shifts in classical physics as an example of the latter,
shifts should be thought of as generating new possibilities (i.e., in our
terminology, as violating some versions of SYM-ONE). His reasoning goes
as follows (Belot 2018:954):
So there doesn’t seem to be much room to deny that there is a
large community of people according to whose modal concepts
shifts generate new possibilities—large, that is, relative to the
number of philosophers interested in these matters. So shiftless
philosophers are engaged in the revisionary project of trying to
construct new modal concepts to replace ones in common use.
That may well be worthwhile. But unless they are imagining
converting physicists to the use of these new concepts (a tall
order, to say the least), they will still end up facing the problem
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the rest of us face: trying to construct an analytic framework to
make sense of a collection of modal concepts according to which
shifts generate new possibilities—since they will, presumably,
still want to make sense of the modal concepts actually in use.
Fletcher (2020) sympathises with Belot’s ideas and applies them to
the case of relativistic physics (2020:241-242):
I am assuming that the representational capacities of a math-
ematical model have an intentional component, in the sense
that they depend on how its users intend it to be a part of
a larger class. And I have taken the relevant class of users
to be mathematicians and mathematically grounded scientists.
(...) Any attempt to impose considerations extrinsic to that
community’s, whether philosophical or mathematical, would
be misplaced in understanding how representation and equiv-
alence work in general relativity, especially if the physicists
outnumber philosophers and mathematicians.
Again, in making judgements concerning representation and equivalence
we are advised to look at how scientists using the mathematical structures
under consideration think of the way these structures represent physical
situations, as well as which of these structures they treat as equivalent
and which not.
How exactly arguments for or against interpretative principles (such as
various versions of SYM-ONE and SYM-MANY) should be formulated is
a subtle issue. Here, based on the papers referred to above (and especially
on the above quotes), I will propose only a rough formulation:
Let T be a physical theory15 and M1, M2 be its two models
related by a dynamical symmetry.
15A theory here is understood in a rather fine-grained way. In particular, if T1 and T2 have
different dynamical equations, then they count as different theories. For example, classical
mechanics would not count as a theory under this understanding but rather as a family of
theories.
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Premise: In scientific practice, models M1 and M2 are re-
garded as representing distinct possible physical situations.
Conclusion: Models M1 and M2 represent distinct possible
physical situations.
This rough formulation will be sufficient for us to understand various ex-
amples of such pairs of models (see section 4), which according to some
authors satisfy the premise of this reasoning and therefore satisfy the
conclusion, which leads them to reject either SYM-ONE-H-W or SYM-
ONE-Q-W or both (depending on whether the distinctness of physical
situations is understood only haecceistically or also qualitatively). How-
ever, as our discussion in section 2 should have made clear, in this version
of the argument from scientific practice there appear ambiguities similar to
those present in the initial formulations of SYM-ONE and SYM-MANY.
Therefore, this form of reasoning will require certain amendments (see
section 5), and I will argue that once these amendments are added, it
becomes very dubious that the counterexamples indeed undermine either
SYM-ONE-H-W or SYM-ONE-Q-W (see section 6).
4 Potential counterexamples to SYM-MANY
and SYM-ONE
In the recent philosophical literature, some authors argue for SYM-MANY
but insist that it should not be strengthened to SYM-ONE; some others
argue that even SYM-MANY is contestable. Their arguments are based
on counterexamples to these principles, which will be presented in this
section.
Belot (2018) argues for SYM-MANY16, at least for the examples he
16Is this SYM-MANY-H-W (which, to recall, is identical to SYM-ONE-Q-W) or SYM-
MANY-Q-W? I think that Belot (2018) has in mind the former, although he does not con-
sider this distinction explicitly. In any case, I am interested in saving the strongest of our
interpretative principles, SYM-ONE-H-W, so it does not matter what the exact target of the
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analyses in that paper (spatio-temporal symmetries in classical mechanics
and isometries17 in General Relativity). Let me invoke the following three
examples.
Example 1 (Belot 2018:953-956): a system of n point particles in clas-
sical mechanics. It is uncontroversial that if such a system is treated as a
subsystem of a larger system, then to specify a configuration completely
one needs 3n parameters.18 However, if there exists nothing besides these
n particles, then what is represented by the model is a global history of
the world and not a history of its subsystem. In accord with SYM-ONE,
fixing a configuration requires less than 3n numbers because configura-
tions that differ only by a translation or rotation of the whole system are
not genuinely different. However, physicists seem to avoid this identifi-
cation according to SYM-ONE. Belot suggests that this is because they
treat rotations and translations as physical symmetries and not as gauge
symmetries (cf. his quotation in section 3). He insists on the signifi-
cance of this distinction both for subsystem models and global models,
so if he is right, then the interpretative principles he establishes should
be valid both under (what I call) the subsystem-interpretation and un-
der the world-interpretation of models (but this is precisely what will be
questioned in section 6).
Example 2 (Belot 2018:956-958): monopoles. This example is sup-
posed to strengthen the previous one. According to Belot, this is the
case where physicists indeed care about the distinction between global
states and subsystem states and are interested in counting possibilities.
In the previous case (i.e., example 1), one can argue that physicists are
counterexamples as conceived by the authors was. Therefore, to avoid overinterpretation, in
this section I will discuss the counterexamples in terms of less precise principles SYM-ONE
and SYM-MANY (understood as holding for models under the world-interpretation).
17Isometries are understood here as diffeomorphisms extended to the metric via the push-
forward operation. This should be distinguished from a narrower sense of isometries, according
to which they are a subset of diffeomorphisms that do not change the metric.
18Here, Belot is interested in the configuration space of the system and not in the phase
space.
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interested only in subsystems of larger systems, so this is why they do
not treat translation- and rotation-related models as equivalent. Here,
according to Belot, physicists explicitly think of the states as global.
Monopoles are magnetically charged particle-like solutions to the Yang-
Mills-Higgs equations. In the physics literature, there are two ways of
counting the number of states of a system of n static monopoles that
disagree about the role of global phase but agree that fixing a position
of each monopole requires 3n parameters. This implies that according
to them, configurations differing only by a translation or rotation of the
whole system are treated as physically non-equivalent.
Example 3 (Belot 2018:964-970): solutions of General Relativity (GR)
that are asymptotically flat at spatial infinity. Typically, they represent
(approximately) isolated systems, such as a single star. A pair of iso-
metric solutions of this type can differ by a time translation at spatial
infinity, so they are not equivalent despite being symmetry-related; ac-
cording to Belot, equivalent solutions must differ at most by an isometry
that is asymptotic to the identity at spatial infinity. In Belot’s own words
(2018:965-966):
Faced with such a pair of isometric solutions (= same pattern
of events, instantiated differently on [space-time] V ) that are
not gauge equivalent (= they are capable of representing dis-
tinct physical possibilities), we conclude that there is a pair of
physical possibilities that similarly differ by a temporal trans-
lation at spatial infinity. So, contrary to the common wisdom
among philosophers, two general relativistic worlds can differ
only as to when things happen, in the sense of differing by a
time translation at infinity.
In his earlier work, Belot (2013) argues for a more radical thesis that
in some cases even SYM-MANY19 is not accurate. Below there are two
19It seems that it is SYM-MANY-H-W (equivalent to SYM-ONE-Q-W) that is questioned
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of his examples.
Example 4 (Belot 2013:7): the one-dimensional harmonic oscillator.
Solutions describing systems of this kind have the form q(t) = A cos t +
B sin t. The symmetries of this system are such that any solution can be
transformed into any other (there is a one-parameter group that changes
the value of A and another that changes the value of B).20 Belot argues
that if SYM-MANY was true, then this theory would not be able to
discriminate between situations that are clearly physically different, for
example, between a permanently immobile oscillator and “the oscillator
continually sproinging around.”
Example 5 (Belot 2013:7): linear homogeneous partial differential
equations. In physics, the heat equation, the wave equation, and the
source-free Maxwell equations are of this type. Again, any two solutions
are related by a symmetry, so SYM-MANY seems to make impossible
distinguishing, for example, between a field in its ground state and prop-
agating waves carrying energy.
Weatherall (2018) argues for the “only if” part of SYM-MANY (i.e.,
if two models are symmetry-related, then they can represent the same
physical situations). According to him, issues of this type should not be
settled on the basis of metaphysical arguments but by purely methodolog-
ical ones. His main assumption is that “the default sense of ‘sameness’
or ‘equivalence’ of mathematical models in physics should be the sense
of equivalence given by the mathematics used in formulating those mod-
els” (2018:3). For example, in GR mathematical objects are Lorentzian
manifolds and Weatherall claims that if they are related by an isometry,
then they should be regarded as physically equivalent—simply because
in mathematics, the standard of identity for Lorentzian manifolds is an
isometry.
here—that is, according to Belot, we have to do with qualitative differences here.
20For technical details, see Wulfman and Wybourne (1976).
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Fletcher (2020) explores further consequences of Weatherall’s ideas.21
He argues against the “only if” part of SYM-ONE (i.e., if two models
are symmetry-related, then they represent the same physical situation;
he calls it “Representational Uniqueness by Mathematical Equivalence”),
against the “if” part of SYM-MANY (i.e., if two models represent the same
physical situations, then they are symmetry-related; he calls it “Represen-
tational Distinctness by Mathematical Inequivalence”) and for the “only
if” part of SYM-MANY (i.e., if two models are symmetry-related, then
they can represent the same physical situations; he calls it “Representa-
tional Equivalence by Mathematical Equivalence”; this is the claim that
he attributes to Weatherall). He uses the following two examples.
Example 6: Schwarzschild space-times (Fletcher 2020:236-239). This
is a family of solutions of GR used to represent black holes. Outside the











dr2 − r2(dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2). (1)
The family is therefore parametrised by one parameter rS ∈ (0,∞). Fletcher
observes that each mathematical Schwarzschild space-time can represent
any physical Schwarzschild space-time (with any rS) through an appropri-
ate choice of units. This is clearly in conflict with SYM-ONE22 because
it implies that any model can represent only one physical situation (since
irrespective of what we mean by symmetries, every model is symmetry-
21Strictly speaking, Fletcher’s examples do not use the term “symmetry” but rather the
term “isomorphism.” Two models are isomorphic if they are structurally the same (the precise
meaning of this depends on what we count as structure in a given context). Being isomorphic
is a different relation than being symmetry-related, as it does not appeal to the theory’s
dynamics. For our current purposes, this distinction will not matter much because all examples
considered here involve symmetry-related models (even if the author’s main focus is on their
being isomorphic), so they may serve as counterexamples to SYM-ONE, even if the original
purpose of invoking them was slightly different. However, in general the distinction between
symmetry and isomorphism is worth bearing in mind.
22 Here SYM-ONE-Q-W seems to be relevant, as the difference in the value of the
Schwarzschild radius is a qualitative one.
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related to itself).
The same family of models can be used to argue against the “if” part
of SYM-ONE. Consider the homothety gab 7→ Cgab with C > 0, C 6= 1.
This is a transformation within the family of Schwarzschild space-times.
By an appropriate change of variables, the transformed metric can be
put into the original form, so models related by this transformation are
suited to represent the same physical situations. However, these space-
times are not isomorphic to each other as Lorentzian manifolds (i.e., they
are not isometric) because their Schwarzschild radii (which are coordinate
independent) are numerically distinct. Therefore, Fletcher concludes that
the RHS of SYM-ONE is satisfied, but the LHS is violated.
Example 7 (Fletcher 2020:237-238): relativistic swerve scenario (an
analogous classical example, put to the same purpose, can be found in
Belot 2013:949-950). Consider Minkowski space-time with one particle
that stays at rest until some moment when it starts to accelerate at a




τ if τ ≤ 0,
(c/a) sinh(aτ/c) if τ > 0,
x(τ) =

c2/a if τ ≤ 0,
(c2/a) cosh(aτ/c) if τ > 0,
y(τ) = z(τ) = 0,
(2)
where τ is the particle’s proper time and a is a constant acceleration.
According to Fletcher, the users of relativity theory “would intend for
the theory to endorse that the particle could have swerved (at the same
acceleration) in another direction, even at another time, than it did in
the above model” (2018:10). But such alternative models are related by
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a symmetry (namely, time translation) to the original one, so according
to SYM-ONE, they are not genuinely different possibilities. Therefore,
modal intuitions of the theory’s users seem to be in conflict with the
“only-if” part of SYM-ONE.23
5 The form of arguments from scientific
practice revisited
In the previous section, we saw certain counterexamples to SYM-ONE-Q-
W and SYM-ONE-H-W. As suggested in section 3, the reasoning based
on these counterexamples takes the following (rough) form:
Let T be a physical theory and M1, M2 be its two models
related by a dynamical symmetry.
Premise: In scientific practice, models M1 and M2 are re-
garded as representing distinct possible physical situations.
Conclusion: Models M1 and M2 represent distinct possible
physical situations.
As suggested earlier (in section 3), this form of arguments from scien-
tific practice is too rough for the purpose of undermining SYM-ONE-H-W
or SYM-ONE-Q-W. First, recall that in some cases the representation re-
lation can work quite differently depending on whether we consider the
models under the subsystem-interpretation or the world-interpretation.
However, the argument has been formulated in terms of “physical situ-
ations”, which is an ambiguous concept. In order to transform it into
a valid argument against SYM-ONE-H-W or SYM-ONE-Q-W, we need
23Is the difference here meant to be qualitative or quantitative? Perhaps each answer is
defensible. On the one hand, the shape of the trajectory of the particle is the same in all
models, which may incline one to think about physical situations represented by these models
as qualitatively the same, differing only in how they are embedded in space-time. On the
other hand, the difference in direction is something that can be observed, which suggests that
it is qualitative. Our analyses in section 6 will apply to both cases, so the answer does not
matter here (cf. footnote 16), but this ambiguity is interesting on its own.
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to additionally assume that the models under investigation can be under-
stood as representing entire possible worlds and not only their subsystems.
This leads to the following modification of the form of the argument:
Premise 1: ModelsM1 andM2 admit the world-interpretation,
that is, they can be used to represent possible worlds.
Premise 2: In scientific practice, models M1 and M2 are re-
garded as representing distinct possible physical situations.
Conclusion: ModelsM1 andM2 under the world-interpretation
represent distinct possible worlds.
This is still not a sufficient refinement because it is possible that
M1 and M2 are used in scientific practice only under the subsystem-
interpretation, even though they admit the world-interpretation. If this is
the case, then Premise 2 is made true solely by the use of these models un-
der the subsystem-interpretation, from which nothing follows about these
models under the world-interpretation. However, our conclusion concerns
the world-interpretation. The following version of the argument closes
this gap:
Premise 1: ModelsM1 andM2 admit the world-interpretation,
that is, they can be used to represent possible worlds.
Premise 2: In scientific practice, models M1 and M2 under
the world-interpretation are regarded as representing distinct
possible worlds.
Conclusion: ModelsM1 andM2 under the world-interpretation
represent distinct possible worlds.
I think that this argument as it stands is still not convincing enough.
This is because scientific practice is not always reliable. It is currently
well known that some actual practices of scientists are methodologically
flawed. A more promising move is to appeal not just to any scientific
practice but to those practices that enjoy predictive success (at least to a
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good approximation). Scientists can be trusted in their grasp of what the
world looks like only when their theories are predictively successful and
only to the extent that is really needed to explain this success.
Does this methodological stance constitute a divergence from the way
of thinking of philosophers who use arguments from scientific practice,
such as those referred to in this paper? Perhaps to some extent it does,
but I believe that this is a difference at the level of declarations rather
than in spirit. I suppose that philosophers who trust arguments from
scientific practice do so precisely because science in general does enjoy
many predictive successes.24 Therefore, I assume that those philosophers
(including the authors whose works are discussed in this paper) would
not object to the following modification of the argument from scientific
practice:
Premise 1: ModelsM1 andM2 admit the world-interpretation,
that is, they can be used to represent possible worlds.
Premise 2: In scientific practice, models M1 and M2 under
the world-interpretation are regarded as representing distinct
possible worlds.
Premise 3: Predictive success of the scientific practice men-
tioned in Premise 2 relies on Premise 2 being true (i.e., this
practice would be less predictively successful if models M1 and
M2 under the world-interpretation were not regarded as repre-
senting distinct possible worlds).
Conclusion: ModelsM1 andM2 under the world-interpretation
represent distinct possible worlds.
The role of the additional step (i.e., Premise 3) is to ensure that we do
24One could suggest that philosophers focusing on the way in which scientists use certain
terms are interested in capturing scientific practice as such, irrespective of whether it is em-
pirically successful or not. This might be a worthwhile pursuit, but as here we are ultimately
interested in reaching some metaphysical conclusions, the question whether a given scientific
practice is empirically successful is clearly relevant.
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not base our judgement concerning representational equivalence of certain
models on scientific practices that do not contribute to the predictive suc-
cess of science. As long as they do not contribute to the predictive success
of science, we do not have a sufficient basis for believing in their meta-
physical relevance. The burden of proof is on the side of these scientific
practices.
However, our Premise 3 requires even something more—not only that
the scientific practice on which we base our judgements concerning repre-
sentational equivalence is predictively successful but also that this success
is dependent on regarding models M1 and M2 as representing distinct
possible worlds within this scientific practice. It should be clear why this
stronger condition should be imposed. One can imagine the following situ-
ation (and this seems to even be the typical case in physics). Scientists use
models of a certain theory to represent subsystems of the world; they treat
symmetry-related models as representing different physical situations; on
this basis, they generate predictions that turn out to be empirically suc-
cessful; and they admit that models of the same theory can be used to
represent entire possible worlds and not only their subsystems but ac-
tually never use the models of this theory to represent the entire world
in a way that is predictively successful. In such a case, we are not al-
lowed to infer our conclusion, irrespective of whether scientists think of
symmetry-related models under the world-interpretation as representing
distinct possible worlds or the same possible world. This is because their
thinking in either of these two ways does not have any impact on the pre-
dictive success of their scientific practice, and it is precisely this success
that enables us to make inferences from scientific practice to claims about
the physical reality.
Of course, even in this final form the argument is fallible in the sense
that its conclusion can be false even though all the premises are true. This
is because the argument is not a deductive one. Instead, it is similar to
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arguments for scientific realism based on the inference to the best expla-
nation, although these two types of arguments establish different types
of conclusions. For example25, an argument for the existence of electrons
can be formulated in the following way:
Premise 1: The existence of electrons is postulated in scien-
tific practice.
Premise 2: Predictive success of the scientific practice men-
tioned in Premise 1 relies on Premise 1 being true (i.e., this
practice would be less predictively successful if the existence of
electrons was not postulated within it).
Conclusion: Electrons exist.
The conclusion here concerns the existence of objects of a certain kind,
whereas in our argument it concerns the reality of certain differences—
if models M1 and M2 under the world-interpretation represent distinct
possible worlds, then there is a physical difference that corresponds to
the mathematical difference between M1 and M2. Alternatively, the con-
clusion of our argument concerns what physically possible worlds there
are—if models M1 and M2 under the world-interpretation represent dis-
tinct possible worlds, then there are possible worlds differing in the way
that is captured by the mathematical difference between M1 and M2.
In light of this similarity between the two arguments, it seems plau-
sible that at least those who find the argument for scientific realism reli-
able should also endorse the argument from scientific practice as formu-
lated in this section. This does not mean, however, that scientific realists
should reject any of our interpretative principles. By “reliability” I mean
a “softer” counterpart of validity (the latter concept is appropriate for
deductive arguments only). However, a valid argument does not need to
25 Here, I understand scientific realism only as an affirmation of the existence of objects
denoted by theoretical terms, but in general it comprises several theses about scientific theories
(see, e.g., Psillos 1999).
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be sound; that is, its premises can be false and then the conclusion is not
established. I will argue that precisely this is the case for our argument
from scientific practice—it is reliable, but its premises are false, so it does
not constitute the reason for rejecting any version of SYM-ONE.
One can object to my analogy between the above argument and the
argument for scientific realism by pointing out that the conclusions they
establish are of different kinds: the conclusion of the former is about
what a theory says, whereas the conclusion of the latter is about whether
a theory is true. In response, let me repeat that these arguments, as I
understand them here, are both about what there is (where “is” extends
to the realm of mere possibility, so in the broad sense of “is”). Despite
the fact that the conclusion of our argument from scientific practice is
formulated in terms of representation, its main gist is not semantic (what
represents what) but metaphysical (what there is to be represented—are
there distinct possible worlds, whose differences are captured by mathe-
matical differences between two symmetry-related models?). Concerning
the argument for scientific realism, I have already mentioned that here I
am interested only in its existential content (see footnote 25).
6 Saving SYM-ONE-H-W
For the analysis of potential counterexamples to our interpretative prin-
ciples (i.e., versions of SYM-ONE and SYM-MANY), I propose the fol-
lowing strategy that is based solely on the content of these principles and
on the final form of arguments from scientific practice established at the
end of section 5. If two models of a given theory T , M1 and M2, are
regarded in a certain scientific practice as representing different physical
situations, then before we reject some of our interpretative principles, we
should answer the following questions:
(a) Does the theory T have well-formulated dynamics?
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(b) Are M1 and M2 related by a dynamical symmetry?
(c) Do models M1 and M2 admit the world-interpretation? (needed for
Premise 1)
(d) Are models M1 and M2 under the world-interpretation regarded
as representing distinct possible worlds in this scientific practice?
(needed for Premise 2)
(e) Does the theory T contribute to the predictive success of science?
(needed for Premise 3, part 1)
(f) If so, does this contribution rely on using models M1 and M2 under
the world-interpretation? (needed for Premise 3, part 2)
(g) If so, does this contribution rely on regarding models M1 and M2 un-
der the world-interpretation as representing distinct possible worlds?
(needed for Premise 3, part 3)
If the answers to all the above questions are “yes”, then we are entitled
to reject some of our interpretative principles. If the sets of possible worlds
represented by M1 and M2 are different, then we reject SYM-MANY-Q-
W. If these sets are the same and the possible worlds belonging to them
differ qualitatively, then we reject SYM-MANY-H-W (which is identical
to SYM-ONE-Q-W). Finally, if the sets are the same and possible worlds
belonging to them differ only haecceistically, then we reject SYM-ONE-
H-W. Of course, whenever we reject some interpretative principle, we also
need to reject all principles that imply it.
Let me explain briefly where these conditions come from. In condition
(a) by “well-formulated dynamics” I mean what most of physicists and
philosophers of physics would call just “dynamics”. The adjective “well-
formulated” is only to exclude explicitly cases that are dynamical in the
sense of involving some representation of change, but where this change is
not calculated from any equations of motion. For example, Ptolomean and
Copernican models of celestial bodies surely describe motion, so they are
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dynamical in the looser sense, but they lack dynamics in the proper sense.
This is in contrast to Newtonian celestial mechanics, which has a well-
formulated dynamics (consisting of Newton’s second law and Newton’s
law of gravitation). I do not claim that the only way to build a physical
theory is to base it on a well-formulated dynamics in this sense. Condition
(a) is introduced here only because it is needed to pose our question about
SYM-ONE and SYM-MANY (recall that in section 2 we decided to use
the term “symmetry” in the sense of “dynamical symmetry”). If it is
violated, then one cannot even ask which transformations are dynamical
symmetries of the theory T , and, a fortiori, one cannot apply to models
of T any of our interpretative principles concerning symmetries (because
they assume that the set of the dynamical symmetries of the theory is
specified). Therefore, the sense of “well-formulated” is not normative here,
this adjective is only used to differentiate between theories for which the
questions about SYM-ONE and SYM-MANY are well-posed from those
for which they are ill-posed due to the lack of dynamics of an appropriate
kind.26
The condition (b) should be obvious, as our interpretative principles
concern models related by dynamical symmetries, so models that are not
related by dynamical symmetries are irrelevant for their truth or falsity.
The remaining criteria, (c)–(g), are indispensable for the argument from
scientific practice (in its final formulation established at the end of sec-
tion 5) to go through; it is indicated in brackets to which premise of the
argument a given condition corresponds.
One can object that these conditions are too strong in a way that begs
the question against a denier of our interpretative principles. If there is
only one world our predictions are about (i.e., the actual world), then—
the objection might go—it is logically impossible for (g) to be satisfied,
as it requires using M1 and M2 to represent different possible worlds in
26This condition might not seem to be worth mentioning, but it will turn out that it is not
satisfied in example 7.
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a predictively successful way. I agree that (g) is very difficult to satisfy,
but this is not logically impossible, even under the assumption that our
predictions concern only one of the possible worlds. To say that M1 and
M2 represent different possible worlds is to say that there is a physical
difference between possible worlds represented by M1 and M2 (i.e., there
is some proposition p that is true about one of these worlds but not about
the other, where p might be either a qualitative or only a haecceistic
claim), so one can reasonably ask which of these two worlds (if any) is the
actual one (i.e., whether in the actual world p is true). If this physical
difference between worlds represented by M1 and M2 is detectable, then it
is in principle possible to try to answer this question empirically. In such
a case, distinguishing between M1 and M2 contributes to the predictive
success of science, even though at most one of them represents the actual
world.27
Below, I will argue that none of the potential counterexamples to SYM-
ONE-Q-W and SYM-ONE-H-W presented in section 4 satisfies all the
above conditions, which means that they do not succeed in undermining
these interpretative principles.
In example 1, physicists’ reluctance to identify solutions differing only
by translation or rotation can be explained by the fact that they always
27The issue of the observability of differences between symmetry-related models is analysed
in the literature about the so-called direct empirical significance of symmetries (see, e.g., Kosso
2000, Brading and Brown 2004, Greaves and Wallace 2014, Teh 2016). Significantly for our
discussion, only models under the subsystem-interpretation are considered in this context. As
Brading and Brown (2004:646) write (emphases mine):
We maintain that the direct empirical significance of physical symmetries rests on
the possibility of effectively isolated subsystems that may be actively transformed
with respect to the rest of the universe. (...) The example of Galileo’s ship
also illustrates that observing a symmetry involves two observations (...) we first
observe the transformation, which involves transforming a subsystem with respect
to some reference that is itself observable, and we then observe that the symmetry
holds for the subsystem.
According to this quote, we can observe the difference between two symmetry-related states
because they are related to some reference objects, which is possible only if these states are
not the states of the universe as a whole. This suggests that the primary or even the only way
in which a difference between two symmetry-related models can contribute to the predictive
success of science is not available if the models are used to represent the universe as a whole,
which provides a reason to doubt that condition (g) can ever be satisfied.
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assume an implicit laboratory reference frame (cf. footnote 7), and, there-
fore, what they have in mind when counting possibilities are models un-
der the subsystem-interpretation and not under the world-interpretation.
Therefore, this example seems to violate our condition (d).28
At this point, one could ask further: if condition (d) was satisfied,
would some of the remaining conditions, (e)–(g), block the argument of
the opponent of SYM-ONE? Starting with (e), classical mechanics has
undoubtedly made a contribution to the predictive success of science (it
is even one of the most important theories in the whole history of science).
However, our understanding of a theory here is more fine-grained, so con-
dition (e) should be understood as being not about classical mechanics,
but (in example 1) its version dealing with n point-like particles. Under
this specification, condition (e) is still satisfied—for example, our Solar
System can be (approximately) represented by models of this theory in a
predictively successful way.
Our next question is whether there are any predictively successful ap-
plications of n-particle classical mechanics to the universe as a whole (i.e.,
whether our condition (f) is satisfied in this example). How might one ar-
gue for or against a claim of this kind? To show that condition (f) is
satisfied, it suffices to provide an example of such successful application.
In contrast, showing that it is not satisfied seems more challenging. I
think that there are two main possible argumentative strategies. The first
strategy is to analyse the history of science, especially of cosmology (in-
cluding, of course, the most recent history), make a list of theories whose
models have been in fact used to represent the universe as a whole with
predictive success, and to check that the theory under investigation is not
on this list. This might seem to be difficult, because for the argument
28Answering this question decisively would require some empirical studies of the physicists’
community (e.g., based on questionnaires). The issue is complicated by the fact that the users
of these models might not even have any definite views concerning the preferred understanding
of such models under the world-interpretation.
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to go through, we need to make sure that our list is complete, which
appears to be impossible because of the vast amount of relevant publi-
cations. However, in fact the list does not need to be fully complete, as
theories can be divided into similarity classes; then it is sufficient to check
that our list is complete with respect to the similarity class, to which the
theory under investigation belongs. Furthermore, instead of investigating
all publications in a given field of science, one can restrict to its authori-
tative textbooks and reviews, which are expected to mention all theories
whose predictive success is not controversial (of course, they may express
the fact of the predictive success of a theory using different words). The
second strategy is to find some features of a theory under investigation
that make its models unsuitable to represent the universe as a whole. If
it possesses such features, then we do not need to engage in the historical
work, as such a theory is in principle not able to satisfy condition (f).
It should be stressed that the second strategy, if it is successful, gives us
more than we need—the argument from scientific practice is an argument
from the actual scientific practice, so showing that it does not work re-
quires only showing that no practice it calls for has taken place, not that
it is impossible.
Concerning the first approach, in contemporary cosmology there is
one theory that is regarded as standard and currently best established,
namely, the so-called ΛCDM model29 that is based on FLRW metric,
which is the solution to Einstein’s equations under the assumptions of
spatial homogeneity and isotropy. Many other theories are considered,30
but none of them enjoys enough predictive success to replace the current
29The word “model” in this expression is used not in the sense that is usual in this paper
(i.e., a model of a theory), but as a name for a kind of a theory.
30See, for example, Krasiński (1997), Bojowald (2015), Joyce et al. (2015), Bull et al. (2016),
Kragh and Longnair (2019). They can be classified in relation to the standard cosmological
model in the following way: (1) GR solutions different than FLRW (inhomogeneous and/or
anisotropic), (2) modifications of GR, (3) alternatives to GR, (4) theories that are supposed
to be more fundamental than GR and expected to reduce to GR in appropriate limits, (5)
semi-classical theories that are between GR and theories of category (5). The boundaries
between these categories are not expected to be sharp.
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standard cosmological model.
It is difficult to find in contemporary cosmology any uses of classical
mechanics to represent the universe as a whole. Newtonian theory is still
regarded as predictively successful with respect to smaller systems such
as the Solar System (which is not the subject of cosmology but of celestial
mechanics; see, e.g., Fitzpatrick 2012), although even in this case GR en-
ables better precision. The only exception I managed to find are papers by
Milne (1934) and McCrea and Milne (1934), which reproduce to a certain
extent the predictions of GR expanding universe model within Newtonian
mechanics. These works have been later revived by Callan, Dicke and
Peebles (1964), and are mentioned in some cosmology textbooks, such as
Sciama (1971:101–110) and Weinberg (1972:474-475); a recent popular-
izing treatment is Jordan (2005). It should be stressed that this is not
the case of classical mechanics making any predictive contribution to cos-
mology on its own, but rather an attempt to reproduce partially31 the
predictive success of GR in cosmology within the framework of classical
mechanics. In any case, the mentioned works do not discuss the issue
of differences between symmetry-related models, so even if we counted
them as an evidence for condition (f) being satisfied by classical mechan-
ics (which seems to me rather far-fetched), this would be not enough to
establish (g).
In the case of example 2, condition (d) cannot be easily dismissed,
as Belot in his presentation explicitly suggests that here physicists really
treat the states as global. If he is right, then condition (d) is satisfied here.
Therefore, we need to examine conditions (e)–(g). Even though there are
no empirical signs of the existence of fundamental magnetic monopoles,
this theory does contribute to the predictive success of science, as certain
systems have effective quasi-particle excitations with magnetic charges
(Castelnovo, Moessner and Sondhi 2008, Rajantie 2012), so condition (e)
31The liminations of the Newtonian approach compared to GR are discussed, for example,
in Sciama (1971:110–117), Weinberg (1972:475) and Jordan (2005:653).
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is satisfied. However, this is surely predictive success only with respect
to subsystems of the universe, not the universe as a whole. In cosmology,
monopoles appear as a theoretical prediction for the early universe, but as
it is not confirmed, various mechanisms have been proposed that account
for their absence (this is known as the ,,monopole problem”; see, e.g., Guth
1981, Lazarides 2006). Even if monopoles turned out to be significant in
cosmology, n-monopole models would not be suitable to represent the
entire universe (even approximately), as we know already that most of
its matter content are objects that are not monopoles. Therefore, we can
conclude that example 2 violates condition (f).
It should be stressed that this line of reasoning does not exclude that
(i) n-monopole models can be thought of as representing entire possible
worlds instead of possible worlds’ subsystems and (ii) n-monopole mod-
els do contribute to the predictive success of science. In other words,
the violation of condition (f) is consistent with conditions (c) and (e)
being satisfied. However, the argument from scientific practice against
SYM-ONE-Q-W or SYM-ONE-H-W requires something more than the
conjunction of (i) and (ii) being true. It requires that the usages of a the-
ory where its models are interpreted as global contribute to the predictive
success of science, and here this is not the case. If n-monopole models
contribute to the predictive success of science, they do so only under the
subsystem-interpretation.
One can object that the modal content of physical theories is also
important for their predictive success, so not only models that represent
the actual universe should be regarded as contributing to this success.
If so, the objection might go, the fact that n-monopole models are not
suitable for representing the actual universe as a whole is not sufficient
for showing that in this case condition (f) is not satisfied.
In response, let us observe that our conditions (e)–(g) are about a
theory, not about models. The last two conditions mention models, but
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it is a theory that is assessed with respect to having or lacking predictive
success. Therefore, one can consistently claim that the modal content
of physical theories contributes to the predictive success of science, while
maintaining that only theories that have models representing (a part or
the whole of) the actual universe contribute to the predictive success of
science. But why should one endorse the latter claim? Surely, not all
theories contribute to the predictive success of science and the boundary
needs to be drawn somewhere. Where exactly it should be drawn depends
on our views on how the modal content of physical theories might con-
tribute to their predictive success. This is a difficult topic and it cannot
be fully analysed here, but let me make some brief comments.
I think that the modal content of a theory is important for its pre-
dictive success primarily because the specification of the content of any
particular model requires other models to be formulated—representing
something is always excluding something else. For example, to represent
a particle as having a velocity ~v, we need to define the whole space of
vectors representing possible velocities, as without that it is impossible to
make any meaningful claim about velocity. Even if only a single model of
a given theory represents (a part or the whole of) the actual universe, it
could not do this without all other models of this theory being defined,
so these other models, which represent merely possible but not actual
physical situations, contribute in this way to the predictive success of this
theory. Other theories are not needed for this purpose, so their contribu-
tion to the predictive success of science cannot be justified merely by their
being related in some way to some theory that is predictively successful.
Another way in which the modal content of a theory may be relevant
for its predictive success is the use of modal claims in scientific practice.
It seems that scientists often make claims that concern not only the actual
happenings, but also what is physically possible or what would happen in
a given situation if the conditions were different (e.g., what would be the
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measured value of some quantity if the experimental arrangement differed
from the actual one in such-and-such way). The issue of empirical testing
of such claims is famously controversial (as we always observe only the
actual course of events and never merely possible ones), but crucial for
our assessment of their importance for the predictive success of physical
theories. I do not have space here for analysing this topic in detail, but
it seems to me that the role of these modal claims can be reconciled with
our thesis that only theories that have models representing (a part or
the whole of) the actual universe contribute to the predictive success of
science. This is because the laws of a theory (in the form of its dynamical
equations) are arguably the basis for all its modal claims (e.g., something
is physically possible according to a theory T iff it is allowed by the laws
of T ) and it is precisely these laws that individuate theories in our sense.
Therefore, starting from a theory with a model that represents (a part or
the whole of) the actual universe, such a theory is sufficient to explain
the truth of its modal claims and no appeal to other theories (postulating
different laws) needs to be made.
Even if these principled and abstract arguments are not fully convinc-
ing, in our attempt to draw the boundary between theories that contribute
to the predictive success of science and those that do not, we can still
appeal to science itself. If a given theory is not mentioned in the authori-
tative textbooks and reviews in the relevant field of science as predictively
successful, then it surely is not regarded as such by the (majority of) sci-
entific community, so we can conclude that it does not satisfy condition
(e). Similarly, if a given theory is mentioned as predictively successful,
but not as predictively successful in representing the universe as a whole,
then we can conclude that it does not satisfy condition (f) for any of its
models. These conclusions are as strong as the authority of the sources we
rely on and may change with the change of consensus in science, but this
way of justifying seems to be appropriate in our context, as the argument
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we analyse is an argument from scientific practice. If some theory is not
mentioned in authoritative textbooks and reviews in the relevant field of
science as being predictively successful, then the burden of proof should
be on the person who claims that it does satisfy condition (e). Similarly,
if some theory is not mentioned in authoritative textbooks and reviews in
the relevant field of science as being predictively successful in represent-
ing the universe as a whole, then the burden of proof is on the person
who claims that it does satisfy condition (f) for some of its models. As
we already observed, in our case the relevant field of science is cosmol-
ogy, and we do not find in its authoritative sources any proclamation of
n-monopole theory being predictively successful in representing the uni-
verse as a whole. The same holds for examples 3–7, so below I will not
repeat this claim in the analysis of these examples, but I will only discuss
issues that are specific to each case.
Example 3 also violates either condition (d) and/or (f). Even though
the GR models in question seem to be most naturally interpreted as rep-
resenting entire possible worlds, as they cover the entire space-time, they
also admit the subsystem-interpretation. Otherwise, they would be un-
suitable to represent anything in the actual world, as the actual world does
not consist of a single star (or any other single massive body). However,
such models are used in scientific practice to represent subsystems of the
actual world and successfully so. In such applications, it is assumed that
there are physical objects in the region that in the model is represented as
empty, but the influence of these objects on the star under investigation
is to a good approximation negligible. Taking this into account, we need
to conclude that in all predictively successful applications these models
are used under the subsystem-interpretation, even though this might not
be obvious at first glance.
What about the family of inertial frames at infinity mentioned by Be-
lot? My proposal is that they can be interpreted as implicitly representing
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some physical observers. Of course, if we take “infinity” literally, then this
is not an admissible interpretation because the measurement cannot be
at an infinite distance from the measured object. However, “infinity”
makes sense here as an idealisation—the actual observers are at a finite
distance from the star, but their influence on it is negligible, almost as
if they were infinitely far away. Granting this interpretation, two such
models differing by a temporal translation at spatial infinity indeed rep-
resent two distinct physical situations but only because the world besides
the explicitly represented single star includes (among other objects) phys-
ical observers located far away from this star. Surely, for us it makes a
difference whether we observe a star at 2 AM or at 3 AM (because our
environment changes in the meantime, and we—the observers—change as
well), even if the modelled star (in its intrinsic aspects) remains the same
throughout this period. Therefore, it is the difference in what is implic-
itly represented (and in the relations of what is explicitly represented to
what is implicitly represented, which are themselves also only implicitly
represented) that makes two such models physically inequivalent. How-
ever, as noted earlier (cf. the discussion of S-W-Equivalence in section 2),
this way of thinking cannot be extended to the same models under the
world-interpretation.
The situation is very similar in the case of examples 4 and 5. Pre-
dictive success of physics does not rely on using models representing a
single harmonic oscillator or an electromagnetic field that is not accom-
panied by any matter under the world-interpretation. Any successful uses
of such models treat them as representing only some part of the physical
world. Therefore, condition (f) is not satisfied here. Importantly, if we
extended any of these models by including more objects, the transfor-
mations mentioned by Belot would no longer be symmetries of the new
dynamics.32 With the addition of some new physical objects, the states
32The same is true for another of Belot’s (2013) examples that I did not mention in section
40
of the harmonic oscillator with different A and B will become distinguish-
able, and the same for different states of the electromagnetic field. To
take a simple example, consider the family of harmonic oscillators with
B = 0—that is, described by q(t) = A cos t. Then, the symmetries that
change the value of A are simply changes of the amplitude of oscillations.
However, the newly added object can be thought of as a rod, with respect
to which this amplitude can be measured. For different values of A, the
fraction between the amplitude of oscillations and the length of the newly
added object will be different. Therefore, the differences between various
values of A will become physically meaningful; but also transformations
changing them would no longer be applicable to the dynamics of the ex-
tended system, so the breakdown of physical equivalence is accompanied
by the breakdown of the symmetry. A similar story can be told, mutatis
mutandis, in the electromagnetic case.
Additionally, in the case of the harmonic oscillator, it is not clear
whether these models admit the world-interpretation at all because the
equation of motion involves force, which perhaps should have some physi-
cal source, but it is not included in the theory.33 If this is so, then example
4 violates even condition (c).
My diagnosis of Fletcher’s example 6 is also similar. Schwarzschild
models are mathematical structures suitable for representing subsystems
of the universe and they can also represent entire possible worlds other
than the actual world, but all their predictively successful applications
in scientific practice have been made under the subsystem-interpretation.
Schwarzschild solution is used in physics in a predictively successful way
to represent neighbourhoods of large massive bodies (e.g., of the Sun in
the calculation of the precession of Mercury; see, e.g., Wald 1984:136–
148) or to represent black holes with zero electric charge and zero angular
4, namely, a generalised symmetry of the Kepler problem associated with the conservation of
the Lenz-Runge vector.
33Recall that theories here are understood in a fine-grained way; cf. footnote 15.
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momentum (see, e.g., Wald 1984:298–299). Therefore, again condition (f)
is violated and perhaps also (d).
There remains a question about the proper understanding of models
with different Schwarzschild radii. I think, contra Fletcher (2020:236),
that the analysis of this case should violate what I have called S-W-
Equivalence (see section 2), that is, the assumption that models under
the world-interpretation and under the subsystem-interpretation repre-
sent physical situations in the same way. Schwarzschild models under the
world-interpretation can be regarded as representing the same possible
world (i.e., the difference in Schwarzschild radii can be thought of as a
mere descriptive redundancy). However, if in the universe there is some
other object, then the fraction between the Schwarzschild radii and the
length of this object is a physically meaningful quantity, so under the
subsystem-interpretation models with different Schwarzschild radii repre-
sent different physical situations.34
For the second part of Fletcher’s analysis of example 6 that involves
homotheties to work against SYM-ONE (presumably against SYM-ONE-
Q-W, cf. footnote 22), one would need to assume that only isometries can
count as symmetries of the family of models under investigation. However,
our understanding of symmetries as transformations leaving invariant the
theory’s dynamics (see section 2) allows us to count homotheties as sym-
metries of Scharzschild space-times, as they are transformations of the
metric that do not change the form of Einstein’s equations for this par-
ticular family of space-times. Therefore, perhaps this Fletcher’s example
shows that models can have the same representational capacities without
being isomorphic35 (if we agree that isometry is a criterion of isomorphism
34The subtlety here is that the metric in GR is sensitive to the presence of material ob-
jects, so after the introduction of some such objects the metric would no longer be exactly
Schwarzschild. However, it could still be approximately Schwarzschild; otherwise, such mod-
els would not be applicable to the actual world. The fact that a model represents a physical
situation only approximately does not on its own undermine the viability of questions about
the way in which it represents.
35Which is in fact what he wanted.
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here), but it does not show that models can have the same representational
capacities without being symmetry-related.
Concerning example 7, one can object that it does not involve well-
formulated dynamics (i.e., it violates condition (a)). We are presented
only with a stand-alone family of trajectories (given by equation (2))
instead of a full-blown physical theory with dynamical equations such
that the presented trajectories are their solutions. Without having such
equations, we cannot even ask what the dynamical symmetries of this
theory are, so, a fortiori, we are not even able to pose the question of
whether some of our interpretative principles hold here. Furthermore, if
an acceleration is present, this means that there is some force acting on
a particle, which indicates that perhaps this could not be a global model
(condition (c)), similarly as in the case of example 4.
Can example 7 be reformulated so that it will satisfy our condition
(a)? This would require finding some dynamical equations, the solutions
of which are swerve trajectories. They would need to be indeterminis-
tic, as at least some of these solutions do not differ before certain time.
This is rather difficult, as typically considered dynamical equations have
a unique solution. However, there are exceptions, one of which is the
so-called Norton’s dome (Norton 2008). In the case of Norton’s dome,
an object is placed at the top of a dome and the dynamical equations
allow both that it will stay there forever and that it will start to move at
an arbitrary time (the latter corresponds to Fletcher’s swerve). However,
there are no predictively successful scientific practices using anything sim-
ilar to Norton’s dome, so it is likely that a modified version of example 7
satisfying condition (a) would violate condition (e). This means that an
argument from scientific practice based on this example cannot succeed.36
The above analysis shows that SYM-ONE, if understood as holding for
models under the world-interpretation (i.e., as SYM-ONE-Q-W or SYM-
36This does not mean that Norton’s dome cannot be used in the argumentation for which
it was devised—namely, that Newtonian mechanics is not fully deterministic.
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ONE-H-W), is not so easy to undermine by means of arguments from
scientific practice. It is consistent with successful scientific practice, at
least if we are considering the examples reviewed in section 4 and many
others that are similar to them.
7 Summary
The aim of this paper was to present a strategy for analysing potential
counterexamples to interpretative principles concerning symmetries, such
as SYM-ONE-Q-W and SYM-ONE-H-W. This strategy consists of check-
ing seven conditions, (a)–(g), which need to be satisfied for the argument
appealing to such counterexamples to go through. It has been argued
that none of the potential counterexamples reviewed in section 4 satisfy
all seven conditions, so we do not have at our disposal a good argument
from scientific practice undermining SYM-ONE-Q-W or SYM-ONE-H-W.
Does this mean that these interpretative principles should be regarded
as true? The argumentation of this paper supports this conclusion (or at
least keeps it “on the table” as a live option), but of course it is not suffi-
cient for showing this. Perhaps one can find some other counterexamples
that satisfy all conditions (a)–(g). This would be difficult, as models of
physical theories are usually used to represent only subsystems of the uni-
verse; and if they are used to represent the entire universe, the predictive
success of such scientific practices can be independent of any assump-
tions concerning the representational (in)equivalence of symmetry-related
models. It is also conceivable that arguments of a different kind can be
important in this debate; I just do not take them into account here, as this
paper is devoted solely to analysing arguments from scientific practice.37
37A note on the recently made distinction between the “interpretational” approach and the
“motivational” approach to symmetries (Møller-Nielsen 2017, Read and Møller-Nielsen 2020)
is in place here. According to the interpretational approach, we can regard two symmetry-
related non-isomorphic models (call them M1 and M2) as representing the same possible
physical situation solely on the basis that they are symmetry-related, whereas according to
the motivational approach, the fact that two non-isomorphic models are symmetry-related
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To definitely exclude the possibility of violations of SYM-ONE-Q-W and
SYM-ONE-H-W, we should not restrict ourselves to discussing potential
counterexamples to these principles but formulate some positive argument
for these principles, which seems to be rather difficult.38
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